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TAXATION
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*
Old issues of constitutional law never die; they won't even
fade away. The Supreme Court of South Carolina handed
down two important decisions in the field of taxation during
the period covered by this Survey. Each case presented prob-
lems with constitutional law overtones familiar to the federal
tax practitioner. In each case, counsel relied heavily on
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which
most students of federal tax jurisprudence perhaps agree
would be overruled if they could be squarely presented before
that Court today. The line of decisions1 invoked by counsel in
Roper v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 231 S. C. 587, 99
S. E. 2d 377 (1957), cert. denied, 78 S. Ct. 342 (1958), was
held by the Supreme Court of South Carolina to be inappli-
cable under the tax statute involved in that case; the de-
cisions 2 relied upon in Crawford v. South Carolina Tax Com-
mission, 232 S. C. 113, 101 S. E. 2d 267 (1957), were held by
the Court to be controlling, without extended discussion.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 (1918) (stock dividend held not
income under federal act of October 3, 1913, although the act specified
that net income should include "dividends"); Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U. S. 189 (1920) (provision of Revenue Act of 1916 that a "stock divi-
dend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value," held,
in case involving common dividend on outstanding common, not within
the 16th Amendment, and unconstitutional under Article 1, § 2, cl. 3, and
Article 1, § 9, cl. 4, of the Constitution); Koshland v. Helvering, 298
U. S. 441 (1936) and Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937) (hold-
ings which weakened the doctrine of Eisner v. Macomber, by stating
that Congress could tax as income distributions of stock which essen-
tially changed the proportional interest of the shareholder in the cor-
poration); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U. S. 371 (1943) (dividend of
common on common held not taxable, by statutory construction, despite
language in Internal Revenue Code of 1939 that "a distribution made
by a corporation to its shareholders in its stock or in rights to acquire
its stock shall not be treated as a dividend to the extent that it does
not constitute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution"); Strassburger v. Commis-
sioner, 318 U. S. 604 (1943) (dividend of preferred on common, rule
of Griffiths case held controlling). The cases are discussed in the ex-
cellent opinion of Circuit Judge Griffith, below, Transcript of Record
p. 15.
2. Schlesinger v. State of Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926), and Hei-
ner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
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Taxability of Stock Dividend - Preferred on Common -
Where Single Shareholder
The Roper case involved the taxability under the Income
Tax Act of 19263 of a preferred stock dividend issued in 1951
to the holder of all outstanding common stock of the corpora-
tion.4 Prior to this dividend, the corporation had no out-
standing preferred. Taxpayer argued that the State Income
Tax Act was modeled on the federal act, and hence that fed-
eral law should conclusively supply the answer. Directly in
point is the federal decision in Strassburger v. Commissioner,
318 U. S. 604 (1943),r holding that a preferred stock divi-
dend to the holder of all then outstanding stock of the cor-
poration, all of which was common stock, was not taxable
under the Revenue Act of 1936.6 Mr. Justice Moss for the
Supreme Court rejected the major premise of this argument,
pointing out that although the 1922 State Income Tax Act7
in terms adopted the federal income tax law, and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder, the 1926 South Caro-
lina Income Tax Act repealed the 1922 Act. The Court held
that the effect of this repeal was to give the state a "separate
and distinct income tax law." s
3. CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 65-201 et seq.
4. Roper Motor Company had an authorized capital stock of $6,000,
divided into 60 shares of common, all held by the taxpayer, J. A. Roper.
In 1951 the charter of the corporation was amended to provide for the
issuance of $124,000 par value preferred, and 1240 shares of $100 par
preferred were issued to taxpayer as a stock dividend. The Tax Com-
mission contended that the shares constituted income in the entire face
amount of the preferred, and assessed the taxpayer $6200 plus interest.
Taxpayer paid under protest and brought this action to recover. Re-
spondent Tax Commission demurred to the complaint, Circuit Judge
Griffith sustaining the demurrer.
5. The opinion of Mr. Justice Moss, 99 S. E. 2d 379, erroneously
refers to this case as the ,Sprouse case, decided in the same opinion as
Strassburger. The Sprouse case involved a dividend of non-voting com-
mon to holders of voting and non-voting common.
6. Cn. 690, 49 STAT. 1648, 1688; INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1939 § 115 (f)
(1). The pertinent language of the Act is quoted in note 1, supra, in
discussion of the Griffiths case.
7. Act No. 502, March 13, 1922, 32 STAT. 896.
8. The decision not to open the Pandora's box of federal law on this
subject is sound on pragmatic as well as historical grounds. The involu-
tions of federal law are reviewed in Circuit Judge Griffith's opinion
below, Transcript of Record, p. 15, and are more helpful to indicate to
the Court the problems that are involved in stock distributions than to
provide the answers thereon. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 adopts
a new approach to the problem, §§ 305, 306, which in brief provide that
no tax arises upon the distribution of a stock dividend, but a tax arises,
under some circumstances at ordinary income tax rates, when the shares
are sold.
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Since the definition of "gross income" in the 1926 Act in-
cluded "income ... from ... dividends," the Court deemed
the remaining question to be the meaning of the term "divi-
dends" in the 1926 Act. Mr. Justice Moss said :10
We must construe the word "dividend" in the plain,
ordinary and popular sense of gain or profit. There is
nothing in the Income Tax Act of 1926 which shows that
the General Assembly used the word in a technical or pe-
culiar sense....
The Court held that as commonly understood, a preferred
stock dividend on common was a "dividend" and thus consti-
tuted income under the Act. The "peculiar and distinguishing
characteristics" of preferred stock were judicially noticed, and
some reliance was placed by the Court on the administrative
construction given the Act by the Tax Commission."
The Court refrained from dicta on the interesting question
whether a dividend of common stock on common would be
taxable. That question arose in the leading federal case of
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920), in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that an income tax
levied on a dividend of common stock issued pro rata to out-
standing common was not within the power given by the
Sixteenth Amendment, and that such a tax was unconstitu-
tional.12 The pithy dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in the
Macomber case used the same "common understanding" ap-
proach as was employed by Mr. Justice Moss in the instant
case; Mr. Justice Brandeis filed a more lengthy and highly
persuasive dissent, employing the same approach.'3 The opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Moss contains two suggestions, however,
that a dividend of common on common would not be embraced
by the holding in the instant case. First, the Court stressed
the fact that preferred was involved in the case at bar, taking
judicial notice of its characteristics. Thus, at the least, the
Court has a path open to distinguish the Roper case if the
more difficult case should come before it. Second, and of more
immediate practical effect, the Court relied upon the admin-
9. CoDn 0 LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 65-251.
10. Roper v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 231 S. C. 587, 599, 99
S. E. 2d 377, 383 (1957).
11. Opinion of South Carolina Tax Commission, August 29, 1938,
CCH South Carolina State Tax Reporter, par. 10-354.84.
12. Under Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 3 and Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 4 of the original
Constitution, requiring apportionment for the levy of direct taxes.
13. The Holmes dissent is at 252 U. S., 219; the Brandeis dissent at
252 U. S., 220.
[Vol. 11
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istrative interpretation of the statute by the Tax Commis-
sion, and that interpretation has consistently held a dividend
of common stock on common to be nontaxable. 14 Unless the
Tax Commission should change this policy, the common on
common problem will not be presented.
Estate Tax - "Conclusive Presumption" of Contemplation
of Death
In the Crawford case' 5 the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional the "contemplation of death" provision of the South
Carolina inheritance tax. s Within three years prior to his
death a decedent had made several gifts to his son, daughter,
son-in-law and daughter-in-law. The Tax Commission con-
strued the quoted statute to require the inclusion of such gifts
in the taxable estate, regardless of the motivation of the gifts
and regardless of whether they were in fact in contemplation
of death. The executors of the decedent and the beneficiaries
of the gifts contended that the statute as so construed was
unconstitutional, citing the Schlesinger 7 and Donnan5 de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The South
Carolina Court held that the phrase "shall be considered" cre-
ated a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption. 9 Citing the
14. Supra note 11.
15. 232 S. C. 113, 101 S. E. 2d 267 (1957).
16. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 65-464, 1957 Cumulative
Supplement, Vol. 6, p. 64: "Transfers of property by gift or deed be-
tween parties related by blood or marriage, made and completed within
three years prior to death and without an adequate valuable considera-
tion, shall be considered as taxable transfers under this article made in
contemplation of death." The 1953 Amendment changed the period of
time from five to three years.
Following the Crawford decision, the General Assembly amended the
statute to remove the constitutional objection found therein by the Court.
The amended text, ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1958,
p. 1680, reads:
Section 65-464. Transfers of property, either by direct or indirect
gift, deed or other conveyance made and completed between parties
related by blood or marriage within three years prior to date of
death of the transferor without an adequate valuable consideration,
shall, unless taxpayer establishes before the Commission facts to the
contrary, be construed prima facie to have been made in contempla-
tion of death and shall be taxable under this Article.
17. Schlesinger v. State of Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926).
18. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
19. Despite more than a half century of objection from professors of
the law of evidence, who argued that the so-called "conclusive presump-
tion" is not a presumption at all, but a rule of law, 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE)
§ 2492; 4 id. § 1353 (1940), courts and lawyers continue to employ the
term. Use of the term "presumption" leads to the erroneous reasoning
that the statute "precludes the ascertainment of the truth in respect of
that requisite upon which liability is made to rest," Mr. Justice Suther-
land in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S., 328 (1932). The correct analysis
4
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Schlesinger and Donnan decisions, the brief opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Stukes continues :20
These decisions speak for themselves and need no discus-
sion. In the first cited a statute which prescribed that
transfers of property within six years of death "shall be
construed" to have been in contemplation of death was
held invalid; and in the second, transfers within tvo
years of death "shall be deemed and held to have been
made in contemplation of death" met the same fate....
Upon consideration we are constrained to agree with the
construction of the statute by the Commission, whereby
it becomes invalid under the cited authorities and others
which may be found in the annotation in 75 A. L. R. 544,
547. Supplementary annotations appear in 120 A. L. R.
170, 184, and 148 A. L. R. 1051, 1056....
The opinion of the Court falls short of intellectual satis-
faction in two respects. First, although it is clear that the
Court is striking down the statute as a denial of due process
of law,2 1 nowhere does the Court indicate whether it is basing
its holding on the State Constitution, the Federal Constitution,
or on both.2 2 Since the Tax Commission did not seek certiorari
of the constitutional problem faced by the courts in this type of case is
that set forth by Chief Justice Vinje of Wisconsin in the Schlesinger
case, 199 N. W., 953 (headnotes 5, 6 and 7). The legislature has admit-
ted power to levy a tax on the transfer of property at death, and ad-
mitted p ower to tax under such a statute gifts made in contemplation of
death and with an intention of avoiding the death tax. The question
is whether it is arbitrary and unreasonable to the extent of a failure
of due process for the legislature to provide that for gifts within three
years (or some greater or shorter period) of the death of the deceased,
actual contemplation of death is irrelevant, and all such transfers will
be caught by the tax. To repeat, such a statute creates a rule of law
that once the transfer is proved to be within three years of death, the
mental attitude of the transferor becomes irrelevant, and the property
transferred is subject to the tax. The legislature justifies such a pro-
vision on the argument that without such a rule, the difficulties of proof
of contemplation of death are so great that practical administration of
the statute requires the strict rule. Such a finding of the administrative
department of the state, adopted and approved in the statute by the
legislature, should not be lightly cast aside by the Court.
20. Crawford v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 232 S. C. 113, 114-
115, 101 S. E. 2d 267, 268 (1957).
21. The Schlesinger case struck down under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process clause the provision of a Wisconsin statute providing
that transfers within six years prior to death "shall be construed to have
been made in contemplation of death," although the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin had upheld the provision, Ebeling's Estate, 169 Wis. 432, 172
N. W. 734, 4 A. L. R. 1519 (1919); Re Schlesinger, 184 Wis. 1, 199
N. W. 951 (1924). Heiner v. Donnan struck down a similar provision
of the federal estate tax as violating the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
22. S. C. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1895) contains a due process clause. If
the decision of the Court rests on this Section, there would be an inde-
5
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in the Supreme Court of the United States,23 but moved
rather to amend the statute to remove the objectionable lan-
guage, this question perhaps is academic. But a second and
more fundamental consideration remains, whichever Consti-
tution the Court had in mind as the basis for its decision.
The cases cited by the Court are looked upon as of doubtful
legitimacy even in the jurisdiction of their birth ;24 later cases
have rejected their underlying premises. 25 Experience -with
the federal statute has indicated, as stated by the late Ran-
dolph Paul, that the rebuttable presumption provision "has
been productive of litigation but not of revenue,"2 6 and the
existence of the South Carolina statute is some evidence of
like experience in this state. In short, three decades of reason-
ing and experience with the problem have confirmed the
views expressed in dissent by Mr. Justice Holmes in the
Schlesinger case :27
.... If the time were six months instead of six years
I hardly think that the power of the state to pass the law
would be denied, as the difficulty of proof would warrant
making the presumption absolute; and while I should not
dream of asking where the line can be drawn, since the
great body of the law consists in drawing such lines, yet
when you realize that you are dealing with a matter of
pendent state ground for the decision and hence no reviewable federal
question even though the Court also struck down the statute under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Min-
nesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 (1940).
23. Presumably certiorari would lie only if the decision of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina holding the provision unconstitutional were
based solely on the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. See note 22 supra.
24. LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Grrn TAXES (1956)
states, at p. 19, "It seems clear that the prevailing test today of the con-
stitutionality of a tax upon an inter vivos transfer under the federal
estate tax is the penumbra theory. Although Heiner v. Donnan has
never been explicitly overruled, the reasoning of the majority of the
court in that case has been so undermined by the later decisions that its
continued validity is certainly suspect."
25. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Company, 296 U. S. 85
(1935) (Federal estate tax provision including in the gross estate prop-
erty in an inter vivos trust revocable by the deceased grantor only in
conjunction with a person holding a substantial adverse interest, upheld
over Fifth Amendment attack, Court adopting the penumbra theory);
Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 (1938) (Federal estate tax pro-
vision including in the gross estate property transferred subject to a
reserved life estate, upheld on same theory).
26. Hearings Before House Ways and Means Committee, 77th Congr.,
2d Sess., on Revenue Revision of 1942, p. 91; cited, BiTTxR, FEDERAL
INomE, ESTATE AND GIT TAXATION (Cases and Materials) 1059 (1955).
27. 270 U. S. 229, 241. Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone
concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes.
1958]
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degree you must realize that reasonable men may differ
widely as to the place where the line should fall. I think
that our discussion should end if we admit, what I cer-
tainly believe, that reasonable men might regard six
years as not too remote. Of course many gifts will be hit
by the tax that were made with no contemplation of
death. But the law allows a penumbra to be embraced
that goes beyond the outline of its object in order that
the object may be secured. A typical instance is the pro-
hibition of the sale of intoxicating malt liquors in order
to make effective a prohibition of the sale of beer....
In such cases, and they are familiar, the 14th Amendment
is invoked in vain....
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